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Austerity and hospitals in deficit: Is PPP termination the answer? 
Introduction 
Eight years of historically low funding growth for the English National Health Service (NHS) 
(with per capita increases slowing from a long-term average of 4.4% a year to 0.1% a year 
from 2009-10 to 2017-18 (Charlesworth and Johnson, 2018)), has been coupled with 
increasing demand pressures from a growing and ageing population (Charlesworth and 
Johnson, 2018). Consequently, the NHS has found it increasingly difficult to perform on 
several high-profile targets (Harker, 2018). This failure has occurred in the context of several 
consecutive years of substantial overspending by NHS provider organisations – NHS Trusts 
and Foundation Trusts (Gainsbury, 2016). With the government intent on continuing its 
deficit and debt reduction path within a framework of ‘austerity’ focused almost exclusively 
on the expenditure side (Bramall, 2013), the longer-term outlook for NHS spending is 
unclear. In this context, NHS organisations have begun to explore radical solutions for 
reducing their costs. Payments made under Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contracts (called 
Public Private Partnerships, or PPPs, outside of the United Kingdom) are ring-fenced and 
indexed to inflation (Pollock et al., 2011). Reported savings obtained by the early 
termination of a PPP contract at the Hexham General Hospital led to calls, by politicians and 
some NHS managers, to repeat this experience elsewhere (Tizard, 2017). Our aim in this 
paper is to examine the financial feasibility of responding to the pressures created by 
austerity in this particular way. Following Bracci et al, (2015), we argue that accounting is 
too challenging and complex to be pigeonholed as a process of simply ‘balancing the books’. 
The strategy of reducing expenditure by terminating PPP contracts early will inevitably 
create winners and losers in society, and its impact on social welfare as a whole is in 
question. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next (second) section briefly discusses approaches to 
austerity in the United Kingdom and its impact on public spending on the NHS. Section three 
provides some background on the use of PPP in the health sector and the potential for early 
contract termination. Section four sets out the research methods underpinning our 
empirical results. These draw on publicly available data regarding NHS funding, and financial 
statements relating to eight potential termination cases for which we have identified the 
expected financial costs of termination. Section five presents our findings, which highlight 
the legal restrictions and financial realities that influence the decision about whether a 
project should be terminated or not. However, as the concluding section discusses, they also 
provide evidence of an alternative story to be told about public spending on the NHS and 
the social usefulness of accounting information.  
Background to austerity and its impacts on NHS provider organisations 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the government of the United Kingdom had the 
largest budget deficit as a proportion of national income in the peacetime history of the 
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country. While a proportion of this borrowing was a result of the short-term reduction in 
growth attributable to the economic crisis, a large proportion of it was judged by 
government to represent a permanent imbalance in the government’s income and 
expenditure. Since the crisis, policymakers have implemented a fiscal consolidation with the 
stated intention of reducing this part of this structural deficit as a proportion of national 
income. The total value of discretionary tax increases and public expenditure cuts 
implemented in the nine years prior to the 2017 Budget is approximately £199 billion in 
today’s money. Of this, just £32 billion was achieved through net tax rises, while 84% was 
achieved through reductions in spending (Institute of Fiscal Studies, 2018). 
The imbalance between tax rises and spending cuts promoted by the UK government 
illustrates how austerity and the decisions made in its name are shaped by complex 
ideological phenomena (Bramall, 2013). In particular, the emergency conditions that create 
the context for austerity may facilitate a government’s desire to reduce services and shrink 
the state in a way that is politically unviable in more normal times (McCann, 2013). Not all 
public services are equal, however. Due to the political sensitivity of the NHS in particular 
(Blyth, 2013), the coalition government that took charge in 2010 pledged to ring-fence its 
funding from cuts. The 2010 Spending Review outlined cash spending plans for the period 
2011/12 to 2014/15 that were just sufficient to freeze NHS spending in real terms. In 
practice some additional funding was provided, however in per capita terms, the increases 
in spending nonetheless slowed from a long-term average of 4.4% a year to 0.1% a year 
from 2009-10 to 2017-18 (Hellowell et al, 2018). 
As the demand for and relative prices of healthcare have increased over this period 
(Hellowell et al, 2018), the pressure for cost containment within the NHS has increased. In 
practice, this pressure has been transmitted from central government to the main provider 
organisations - NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts - through reductions to the NHS tariff, 
which determines a national price for the treatments and packages of care these 
organisations provide. For example, the tariff paid for finished courses of treatment for 
patients was reduced in real-terms (i.e. adjusting for NHS provider inflation) every year 
between 2010/11 and 2015/16, by an average of 3.8% per annum (Gainsbury, 2016). 
Providers have needed to make a 4% cut in their operating costs every year from 2011/12. 
The Office for Budgetary Responsibility estimates that long-term healthcare productivity 
increases at an average rate of 1.2% per annum (OBR, 2016), yet NHS providers’ annual 
cost-cutting efforts were nearer 2% by 2015/16. In that year, a £600 million underlying 
deficit emerged in NHS provider financial statements. The following year the underlying 
deficit more than doubled to £1.5 billion, and then in 2015/16 it doubled again, to £3 billion 
(NHS Improvement 2016a). Although £1.8bn was made available in 2016/17 to NHS 
providers, through the Sustainability and Transformation Fund, financial performance 
information from providers showed them on track to record a deficit of £670 million by the 
end of that year (NHS Improvement 2016b). 
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Background on PPP and PPP termination 
  
Under PPP contracts, private operators (normally special purpose vehicles owned by a 
consortium of construction companies and financial investors) are contracted by 
governments to finance and deliver defined units of infrastructure and related services. The 
payment to the private operator is made as, when, and to the extent that the outputs 
specified in the contract are delivered. In practice, the payment to the private operator is 
constituted as a prospective global budget but its payment is influenced by performance – 
specifically, performance in terms of making available the contracted assets and services at 
the standard outlined in the contract (Hellowell et al, 2015). So long as this is achieved, the 
public authority is obliged to pay the defined fee.  
The most recent figures available show that the health sector has used PPP for more capital 
investment than any other department (at £13 billion in total) (Treasury, 2017). NHS 
organisations made total unitary charge payments of £2 billion in 2016-17. At 1.7% of the 
total cash budget for the Department of Health and Social Care, this is a manageable sum at 
the aggregate level. However, this figure obscures a significant variation between NHS 
organisations. Most have no PPP deals but some have several. For the latter, unitary charges 
vary between 5.6% and 20.1% of their turnover (National Audit Office, 2018). It is known 
that these payments are a source of budgetary pressure for the affected organisations 
(Pollock et al., 2011). In total, 121 PPP deals have been procured by NHS providers in 
England, with an aggregate capital value of £11.8bn and a projected cash cost of £81.5bn  
The unitary charge payment, which is a legally binding commitment, includes the costs for 
cleaning, catering, laundering and porters and interest charges. Therefore, efficiency savings 
have to focus on clinical services, which are not provided in UK PPPs. But cutting clinical 
services is organisationally and politically sensitive and may not be achieved quickly. So, it is 
not a surprise that, while only a minority of trusts have a PPP deal, in 2014/15, two thirds of 
trusts with a deficit greater than £25m had one (National Audit Office, 2014). While 
refinancing of capital or renegotiation of unitary payments is theoretically possible, there is 
limited scope to secure gains from such arrangements. For most long-established contracts, 
the decision to refinance rests with the SPV not the public sector (National Audit Office, 
2018). Furthermore, the National Audit Office (2018) notes that only a 1% reduction in total 
future unitary charges is achieved on average by renegotiation. Therefore, hospitals under 
pressure to cut deficits wondered if early termination was a viable option. 
 
PPP termination 
Although there is limited scope to reduce the payments to private operators, NHS 
organisations normally have the right to terminate them, although in these instances a fee 
must be paid. Treasury guidance is that compensation must be paid to contractors so that 
they make the same profit as if the contract had run to full term. This non-confiscation approach 
avoids legal disputes and reputational damage to government although it incurs cost for taxpayers. 




 The Base Senior Debt Termination Amount  
 Redundancy payments for employees of the contractor;  
 Sub-contract break costs; and  
 Compensation for either the base case value or open market value of contractor 
equity and junior debt (Treasury, 2015 section 3.9) 
The UK has experience of 31 terminated PPP contracts, most of which have been forced by 
the procuring authority due to sustained performance problems (Whitfield, 2017). Five 
terminations are in the health sector, but only two are hospital projects1 – West Park in 
Darlington and Hexham. Both were bought out on a voluntary basis in order to reduce 
operational expenditure. The West Park contract (capital value £16m) had run for just 6.2 
years when it was terminated at a cost of £18m in order to obtain expected net total savings 
of £14m (Whitfield, 2017). Hexham (capital value of £54m) was terminated at a cost of 
£114.2m, with the press reporting expected savings as £3.5m per annum for the remaining 
19 years of a 30 year contract (Plimmer and Neville, 2014). 
 
Following a successful Freedom of Information Act request, Hellowell (2015) obtained 
access to advice received by the Hexham Trust on which its termination decision was based. 
This shows that having paid some £67m during the ten year life of the contract the Trust 
was still committed to pay unitary charges totalling £222.5m over the remaining term in 
relation to services such as cleaning, laundry and porters, interest charges to service the 
debt and the capital cost of the infrastructure. The service element of the charge rises in line 
with RPI, and it is likely to be increased by benchmarking or market testing exercises 
(National Audit Office, 2007). While Hexham would still need to pay for cleaning etc. 
services if the PPP contract was terminated early, the expectation was that services could be 
provided more cheaply so that overall early termination would be beneficial. 
The Freedom of Information data shows various scenarios but Hellowell (2015) uses the 
data for termination on 1st April 2014 for illustrative purposes.  This shows a total potential 
saving of £14.3m based on an estimated £107.2m compensation payment.  It is notable that 
this estimate is much lower than the level of savings later reported in the press.  
The compensation payment included £51.8m to repay senior and mezzanine debt and an 
estimated £14.5m for the market value of the SPV’s equity. The compensation was reduced 
by cash balances in the SPV which would belong to its shareholders and there were 
additional relatively small estimates to cover sub-contract breakage and transactions costs. 
However, Hellowell’s report makes clear the large scale of some additional elements of the 
expected compensation. There were estimates of £27m for interest rate and retail price 
                                                          




index swap breakage and £18.2m to cover the SPV’s expected corporation tax liability that 
would inevitably arise on the receipt of compensation.  
The Treasury’s guidance note (Treasury, 2015) on early PPP termination is written in 
cautious and unenthusiastic terms, and it has pressed for alternative means of cost saving 
such as more rigorous application of performance penalty mechanisms and refinancing. 
Nevertheless there is support for terminating other PPP deals. For example, Owen (2016) 
reports Chris Philp, a Conservative member of the Treasury Select Committee, as saying: 
The PFI (PPP) debt burden is unacceptably high. I would like these PFI deals unwound 
as quickly as possible. 
Mason (2015) notes that Simon Stevens, Chief Executive of NHS England, has suggested that 
other Trusts might be able to reduce their costs by following the Hexham decision to 
terminate early. During his successful mayoral campaign Sadiq Khan offered to buy up the 
debt owed on London’s hospitals which ‘are suffocating under the weight of (PFI/PPP) debt 
and radical action needs to be taken to alleviate the growing financial pressures’ (reported 
by Perraudin, 2015). 
Research Method 
We seek to create a counter account (Lehman et al., 2016) about the adequacy of macro-
level funding, and the related proposed response of terminating PPP contracts early. Our 
counter account challenges government rhetoric that funding is adequate but under 
pressure because of inefficiencies, unreasonable patient expectations and rising demand for 
services especially from an ageing population. 
Counter accounts have been defined as alternative representations of individual 
organisations, sectors or industries created by individuals who are beyond the control of the 
entity that is the subject of the account with the intention of rectifying an undesirable state 
of affairs (Thomson et al., 2015). Counter accounts make visible information that has the 
potential to mobilise public action, although it is recognised that empirically they have 
mixed outcomes because their transformational potential is contingent upon the nature of 
the conflict arena and the tactics and interactions associated with their use (Vinnari and 
Laine, 2017). While Lehman et al.’s (2016) counter account was based upon informal 
qualitative sources we use formal and numerical sources of information. We recognise as a 
limitation that there is no definitive counter-factual (Heald and Hodges, 2015). 
We draw a distinction between the provision and the commissioning of health care. 
Increasing demand is essentially a problem for commissioners’ budgets, who, in the UK, 
commission services from providers such as hospitals and community health services. While 
there are concerns about access to community services, citizens’ major concerns are 
focused on capacity in hospitals. That is, the problem is perceived to be one of provision not 
commissioning. Furthermore, it is the providers, and especially the providers of acute 
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services, that are exhibiting financial distress. Therefore, we deploy statistics that show how 
hospitals experiencing stable funding levels are facing reducing tariffs in exchange for the 
services they deliver while attempting to meet the needs of growing populations. Thus we 
present an alternative accounting to that provided by government, and like Lehman et 
al.(2016) seek to focus on new knowledge and reinstate the ethical dimension to the 
rendering of accounts. Our contribution is that we move away from a corporation-centric 
perspective that has largely dominated prior studies on counter accounts (Vinnari and Laine, 
2017) to present a public perspective.  
To critically assess the feasibility of early termination, we used the Treasury’s spreadsheet of 
Department of Health projects. We chose the top 12 projects by capital value, listed in Table 
1, to assess their suitability for this study. We immediately discarded the Liverpool project 
(number 9 in Table 1) because it is not yet operational and so reports no financial data. 
Secondly, we identified the name of the procurer. In three cases a single project has been 
procured by more than one NHS Trust, which means that we will not be able to disentangle 
the costs and so projects 2, 6 and 8 on Table 1 have also been excluded. Thus, our sample 
consists of eight of the largest operational hospital PPP contracts.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
We use the Hexham case as a model for these eight cases because we have the benefit of 
the report by its advisors Deloitte obtained under a Freedom of Information request. The 
Hexham model identifies three crucial questions:  
 What are the financial costs of early termination?  
 How can these costs be funded? 
 Are the expected savings sufficient to make the termination financially desirable? 
Regarding termination costs, data sources include the procuring Hospital Trusts’ financial 
statements and those of the special purpose vehicles (SPV) with which they signed the 
contract. As SPVs are normally established for each individual contract, their financial data is 
known to relate to that contract. As became evident from the reporting of the Hexham case, 
there are costs that are not easy to identify with any degree of accuracy. Our narrative 
makes any uncertainties clear, but this remains a limitation of the paper.  
West Park hospital used a surplus in its financial statements to fund the £18m cost of 
termination (Whitfield, 2017). The Hexham termination was financed by a loan from 
Northumberland County Council, the relevant local government authority. As the Council 
was able to borrow at below market rates of interest from the Public Works Loan Board, 
interest payments faced by the Trust were reduced. As the financial crisis imposed on local 
government by austerity measures means this level of support is unlikely to be repeated by 
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other local authorities (Hellowell, 2015; Whitfield, 2017), we examine the financial 
statements of our eight cases for evidence of surpluses or ability to borrow externally2.  
Termination is financially desirable, that is costs are reduced, if the expected future cost of 
the remaining PPP unitary payments is greater than the cost of compensation plus the cost 
of providing the PPP services in-house. In the West Park and Hexham cases the decision to 
terminate was based on estimates of the costs of compensation and in-house provision of 
services. Our study replicates the Hexham compensation cost calculations, but as our cases 
are prospective not actual terminations there is no equivalent information available about 
expected future in-house costs. Our conclusions thus relate to the financial feasibility, not 
the desirability, of termination, which is a limitation. 
For reasons of space, in the paper we examine the detailed information in relation to just 
one hospital - the Mid Yorkshire case which provided the fullest disclosure of accounting 
information - and provide summary information calculated on the same basis for the other 
seven cases3.  
 
The international context 
While there are always difficulties with international comparisons, extracts from the World 
Health Organisation database are presented in Table 2.  Despite having increased spending 
by a larger percentage than is common in the developed world since 1995, the UK spends 
less per capita than the norm for the wealthiest European countries. For example, the UK 
spend per capita in 2014 was 73% and 79% of the German and French spends respectively. 
Furthermore an analysis by Reeves et al. (2014), using data from the World Health and 
Eurostat, shows that UK government health spending per capita adjusted for inflation and 
purchasing power reduced in common with countries such as Ireland, Spain and Greece, 
whereas spending in countries such as Germany, France and the Netherlands increased.  
Table 2 also shows that while all countries are increasing their commitment to health as a 
proportion of GDP, the UK government has been spending at a consistently lower level than 
its Northern European neighbours, remaining below the average EU spend. This is significant 
because, as Table 2 shows, the UK has been consistently more dependent on public spend 
                                                          
2 Hospitals are either designated as NHS Foundation Trusts, which have operational autonomy and some 
borrowing powers, or NHS Trusts, which have limited autonomy. In this analysis we ignore the legal ability to 
borrow to terminate a contract as our focus is on the cost of so doing, and our argument is that these costs are 
so high as to be unaffordable for an individual Trust.  
3 The same explanations of the calculations as provided for Mid-Yorkshire, not presented in detail here for 
reasons of space, are available from the authors. Supplementary information available on line provides an 
expanded version of Table 8 for all cases.  
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as a proportion of the total health spend than is common for the largest European countries 
and compared to the EU and OECD averages. 
 Insert Table 2 about here 
It is clear from international comparative analysis, that the UK is currently a lower spender 
on health services than its Northern European neighbours and the OECD average.  
What are the costs of early PPP termination? 
Our second set of questions focus on the early termination of PPPs: what are the nature and 
size of terminations costs? Is there adequate information in the public domain for an 
evaluation of a termination decision? This section follows the model established for the 
Hexham termination to determine the expected financial costs associated with a decision to 
terminate. In the Hexham case estimates were assessed based on internal Trust data and 
data made available to the Trust and its advisors by the SPV. We rely upon information in 
the public domain drawn from the financial statements of the Trusts and the related SPVs. 
Our figures are drawn from the 2015/2016 financial statements of the Trusts and the most 
recent financial statements for the SPVs relevant to that period. Based on Hexham the 
termination costs to compensate are: the repayment of debt; the market value of equity; 
transactions and sub-contract breakage costs; the corporation tax liability; and the cost of 
breakage of interest rate and inflation swaps. These costs are mitigated by any cash 
balances held by the SPV. There may also be additional costs associated with the early 
redemption of bond finance, which was not relevant to the Hexham case. We provide 
detailed figures for each of these items in turn for Mid Yorkshire, produce an estimated cost 
of termination for this case, and then provide summary information and estimated costs for 
the other Trusts.  
Before commencing this analysis we briefly provide information about the financial 
performance of the cases.   
Financial performance of the Trusts 
Table 3 is drawn from the Comprehensive Income and Expenditure Statements for 
2015/2016. Only Central Manchester and Derby are generating operating surplus, and all 
except Derby have a deficit for the year. The Derby 2015/2016 financial statements describe 
the Trust as performing reasonably well financially and it has generated a surplus in the last 
two years although its revenue reserves show a small negative.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
A more detailed review of Mid Yorkshire is provided in Table 4, which shows the persistence 
of its financial difficulties since 2012/2013 to 2015/2016. For each of the past four years the 
trust has shown deficits for the year. These deficits persist, albeit at a lower level, even after 
the Trust’s reported financial performance position is adjusted for items which the 
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Department of Health does not consider to be part of the organisation’s financial 
performance4.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 5 shows the surplus or deficit for the financial year in the last four years for each of 
the eight case Trusts. Nationally, whereas only 10% of Trusts were in deficit in 2012/2013, 
five of our sample, all of which have large PPPs, were in deficit in that year (62.5%). With the 
exception of North Midlands in 2014/15, these five Trusts exhibit persistent deficits in the 
last four years. For seven of the eight Trusts there is no clear pattern to the size of the 
deficits across the four years, but Barts shows a steadily worsening financial position. In 
September 2013 Barts published a turnaround plan, which included aspirations to run a 
deficit below £50m for 2013/14 and to breakeven by 2015/16. The actual outcomes for 
these two years were deficits of £111.8m and £222.3m respectively.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
In a change to how they were viewed in the past, public sector entities are now seen as 
quasi-autonomous entities that are responsible for their own financial performance and 
must balance the books (Heald and Hodges, 2015). At least five of these eight Trusts face 
persistent financial difficulties which could lead to a search for solutions, including the 
possibility of an early PPP termination. We now turn to examine the associated costs of 
early termination in detail. Table 6 provides a summary relating to the Mid Yorkshire case 
and this is followed by a discussion of the various cost elements. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
What is the outstanding debt? 
Table 7 shows the bonds and loans initially raised to finance the project and the outstanding 
indebtedness of the Mid Yorkshire SPV at year end 2016. The notes to the financial 
statements do not show a sub-division of the outstanding debt between bond and loans, 
but the total is £392.2m. The debt outstanding has increased from the date of issue due to 
the index linking of the bond, which will likely increase both the principal due and the 
amount of interest payable. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
What is the market value of the equity? 
In regard to PPP financing, commentators often refer to share capital and subordinated debt 
as together representing the equity stake, which is then said to be of the order of 10% of 
the total financing, the balance being long term bonds or loans. The subordinated debt is 
                                                          
4 These adjustments include, for example, impairments to the estate, impacts of eliminating donated asset and 
government grant reserves, and the first time application of IFRIC 12. 
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often subscribed by the shareholders, and for this reason the Deloitte’s report on Hexham 
states that SPV equity stakes are normally valued on the basis of forecasts of distributions 
relating to dividend payments and returns on sub-ordinated debt. Such forecasts are based 
upon the project’s current operating model and discounted to give the present value of 
future cash flows. Deloitte’s report uses its own research showing a secondary market range 
of between 8 and 11 percent, and their report provides information about the valuation 
placed on the SPV by Ernst and Young who were acting on behalf of the SPV.  
The data shows valuations by Deloitte of £14.1m (discounted at 9.5%) and £17.6m (at 7.5%) 
and compares these valuations with the £20m valuation (at 6.2%) by Ernst and Young, 
acting for the SPV. The valuations have different dates, but over the 19 – 21 years remaining 
on the contract at the date of the calculations the valuations suggest expected cash flows 
from dividends and subordinated debt of approximately £1.6 - £1.8m per annum assuming 
these are equally spaced over the years. The Hexham SPV’s financial statements for the year 
end December 2013 immediately prior to the termination show annual interest on the 
unsecured loan amounting to £462,379 and a dividend payment of £361,000. Thus the 
forecast for future years anticipates greater returns that those currently achieved.  
In the absence of access to the operating model, which is deemed to be commercially 
confidential, it is difficult to estimate market values for other hospitals’ SPV stakes. The 
following information relates to providing a range of values that might be relevant in 
relation to Mid Yorkshire.  
 To date the SPV has not made dividend payments.  
 The SPV has share capital of £50,000 and £30,862,000 in subordinated debt, which 
together represent approximately 9% of the total finance initially raised of £352m. 
 The subordinated debt carries an interest rate of 10.17% plus RPI indexation. As RPI 
has been increasing the minimum return to the shareholders is 10.17%.  
The annual return on the subordinated debt is £3.1m. Applying the same discount rates as 
used by Deloitte and Ernst and Young noted above, an annual income of £3.1m over the 
remaining 25 years of this contract suggests a valuation of between £29m and £39m. In line 
with the Hexham findings, the return in future years per the operational model may be 
greater. However, our estimate in Table 6 is based on the lower valuation of £29m. 
What is the reduction for cash balances? 
The SPV’s financial statements report cash balances of £25.2m in December 2015. 
 
What are the transactions costs and sub-contract breakage costs? 
Whitfield (2017) notes that transactions costs are not normally disclosed on terminations, 
however, the value for the Hexham deal was an estimated £1m based on estimates of the 
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final compensation payment to the SPV of £107m and the raising of a matching loan. The 
Mid Yorkshire deal is a substantially larger deal but assuming there will be economies of 
scale in relation to transactions a cautious estimate of £2m has been included. The sub-
contract breakage costs need to be identified by reference to the contracts in place, but 
these were immaterial costs in the Hexham deal and our working assumption is therefore 
that they would also be immaterial in relation to Mid Yorkshire. 
What is the corporation tax gross up? 
The termination payment used to repay the SPV’s debt is a taxable receipt. The Hexham 
case contained a ‘tax gross up’ clause implying that early termination payments must be 
increased to compensate for any consequent tax liability arising in the SPV. This taxation 
charge may be mitigated by any relief due in relation to the breakage costs on the swap 
agreements. As Table 6 shows, the compensation payment excluding the costs of swaps 
breakage is likely to be a minimum of £398m, equating to a tax liability of £75.6m. However, 
information provided to Hexham by their financial advisors indicated that there would also 
be a grossing up of the corporation tax payment. This adds approximately an additional 
£14.4m to the compensation for corporation tax.  
While the corporation tax compensation is a loss to Trusts and to the health sector, it would 
not be a loss to the public sector assuming that the SPV did in fact pay tax to HM Treasury at 
this rate on the transaction. However, under UK tax rules, in practice the norm has been 
that less tax is paid than expected due to group offset rules (Edwards et al., 2004).  
What are the consequences of early redemption of bonds and loans? 
In addition to the repayment of outstanding debt at the date of termination further costs 
may arise if there is bond finance or if there are interest rate swaps in place for loans. 
Bond finance has a contractual feature, known as the Spens clause, which is a potentially 
strong form of protection for investors designed to mitigate the adverse effects of call risk 
(Association of Corporate Treasurers, undated). In case of an early redemption the 
compensation formula includes a par floor, implying that investors will always benefit, 
whether interest rates have risen or fallen since the bond was issued: early redemption can 
be prohibitively expensive for the borrower (Association of Corporate Treasurers, undated). 
Interest rate swaps are a commonly used mechanism in PPP deals whereby SPVs fix rates of 
interest as a protection against the possibility of rising interest rates. Because interest rates 
have fallen since many deals were signed, SPVs are tied into swap contracts which from 
their perspective have a negative value, against which they expect compensation in the 
event of early termination. In relation to the Hexham case, Deloitte used a specialist 
quotation and provided only a combined value for interest rate and inflation swap breakage 
of £27m, representing 52% of the outstanding debt of £51.8m.  
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The Mid Yorkshire Director’s report states that the SPV ‘uses interest rate derivatives to 
manage the mix of fixed and variable rate debt so as to reduce its exposure to changes in 
interest rates’. The annual financial statements for the first year of accounting in 2007 state 
that for both the bond and the loans: 
early redemption may be made at the trust’s option, at a price being the higher of 
the indexed outstanding principal and a price calculated with regard to the yield of a 
reference gilt over the period to the original bond maturity date.  
That is, an early termination will result in costs related to both the Spens clause and interest 
rate swaps. But calculations based on information available in the public domain and for 
hypothetical cases of termination are too uncertain to be reliable. We have therefore not 
included any values for these elements of the compensation payment5.  
Summary of costs of termination for Mid Yorkshire 
Summarising these various cost elements, Table 6 shows an expected minimum cost of 
£488m to terminate this contract before the breakage costs on the swaps and the Spens 
clause effects. That is, £488m would be the minimum loan the Mid Yorkshire Trust would 
need to borrow to realise the deal.  
Note 29 of the Trust’s 2015/2016 financial statements show the current carrying value of its 
indebtedness relating to the PPP project as £302.8m and that the relevant fair value is 
£354.5m. That is, any prospective termination will replace on Balance Sheet debt of just 
over £300m debt with close to a minimum of £500m. Table 8 provides a summary of the 
Mid Yorkshire Trust’s Balance Sheet at year end 2016, which shows a net asset position of 
just £65.1m. It would therefore appear that the Trust’s Balance Sheet would need to be 
restructured to sustain such a large increase in the long term liabilities.   
Insert Table 8 about here 
Table 9 shows our estimate of the compensation needed to effect an early termination of 
the eight Trusts calculated on the same basis as for Mid Yorkshire. While the Barts and 
Bristol projects are larger, typically the other six contracts will require a compensation 
payment of about £500m each with additional payments for the Spens effect, if there is 
bond finance, and for swaps.   
Insert Table 9 about here 
With the exceptions of Derby and Central Manchester all currently have negative retained 
earnings that are considerably greater than their net assets. Furthermore in all cases the 
                                                          





minimum borrowing to enable an early termination is considerably higher than the 
recognised on Balance Sheet PPP liability.  As for Mid Yorkshire, any attempt to borrow to 
make early terminations would require large external capital inputs to restructure the 
Balance Sheets going forward6. 
Discussion and conclusions 
As demand for healthcare has increased, alongside the relative price of healthcare, NHS 
England has transmitted the emerging funding constraints to providers through incremental 
cuts to the tariff they earn from providing services. From 2012/13, when 10% of Trusts were 
in deficit, to the time of writing, there has been a substantial increase in the number of 
Trusts in financial distress as they have been unable to cut costs at the pace required to 
match the reductions in tariffs.  Furthermore, between 2014-15 and 2015-16, NHS 
organisations reported an increase in the critical infrastructure maintenance backlog of 
more than 50% to £2.3 billion (National Audit Office, 2018). This has been driven by 
concepts of austerity and perceptions about the necessity of reducing public expenditure. 
Despite the political rhetoric that has sought to disguise the per capita reductions in NHS 
spending and the tariff reductions for health care providers, the austerity agenda has 
impacted on NHS spending and is changing the NHS funding game. That is, if austerity is 
defined as declining government expenditure in consecutive years when adjusted for 
inflation and purchasing power and expressed in per capita terms (Reeves et al., 2014), 
rather than simply as nil or negative annual growth in financial resources (Prowle and 
Harradine, 2014) the NHS has been subject to austerity measures. The funding realities 
require it to provide more services for less money; a formulation unlikely to be consistent 
with increasing population health need.  
PPP schemes that have undoubtedly enhanced the NHS estate are part of the revenue 
problem. Fourteen years ago Edwards et al. (2004) signalled their concerns about the 
disproportionate number of the first thirteen PPP schemes that were in deficit compared to 
other Trusts, although Lafond et al. (2016) find no statistical association between financial 
position and the existence of a PPP scheme. Nevertheless, at least part of the problem for 
Trusts that have had to be bailed out by substantial assistance from the Department of 
Health is that unitary charges are linked to inflation and benchmarking exercises tend to 
increase costs (National Audit Office, 2014). That is, early termination is about affordability 
rather than performance, although motivation to terminate would likely rise if performance 
were poor or a project no longer met needs.  An additional problem may be an expectations 
gap in relation to rates of return on capital (Froud et al., 2018).  
In 2017/18, 44 per cent of trusts overspent their budgets, with acute hospitals (those most 
likely to be involved in a PPP contract) accounting for just under 90% of all providers in 
deficit. The NHS provider sector as a whole ended 2017/18 with a deficit of £960 million 
                                                          
6 Supplementary information available on line provides summarised Balance Sheets for all 8 cases. 
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(King’s Fund, 2018). One resolution is that savings to non-clinical costs may be made by 
terminating some of the PPP projects. However, the Hexham case was probably unique in 
that it was supported by local government finance which is unlikely to be available 
elsewhere (Hellowell, 2015). Furthermore, unlike the West Park hospital identified by 
Whitfield (2017), the Trusts with large PPP schemes do not typically have surpluses to 
facilitate early termination.  The evidence presented here shows that the Trusts with large 
PPP schemes do not have sufficiently strong Balance Sheets on an individual basis to 
support the massive increase in borrowings that terminations require. Thus government 
intervention would be necessary, raising questions about the opportunity costs involved in 
supporting healthcare in this way.  
 
Although this critical assessment of the costs of early termination is focused on UK 
contracts, it also has international value. Many countries followed the UK’s lead into various 
forms of PPP, and indeed in an age of austerity some form of PPP arrangement is often 
promoted as the only viable mechanism for obtaining much needed infrastructure. But 
should long term contractual commitments prove unsustainable in an age of austerity, 
because typically they are legally binding agreements, compensation must be paid to avoid 
legal suits and reputational damage, meaning the costs of early termination may be 
prohibitively high. One lesson learned in the UK is that the new PF2 type of PPP 
arrangement includes a partial termination contractual mechanism, intended to ‘slightly 
lower’ the level of compensation payable in the event of a full termination (National Audit 
Office, 2018). 
Our analysis has shown that there is only limited information in the public domain upon 
which to base an assessment of the potential costs of early terminations, yet the UK has a 
reasonable reputation for transparency of financial reporting and a Freedom of Information 
Act to support transparency in relation to government, although not private corporations’, 
activities. Should early termination come onto other countries’ austerity agendas, our 
problems estimating the costs of termination are likely to be repeated and may even be 
greater in developing nations. Our conclusion is that early termination of long term 
contracts is not financially viable if the main purpose is a short term measure to reduce 
politically inconvenient deficits in the financial statements of healthcare providers.7   
We recognise as a limitation that providing a counter account may not be effective in 
producing change but take heart from Brennan and Merkl-Davies’ (2014) finding that there 
must be persistent critique of practices, such as the austerity agenda, over a period of time 
and that the mode and content of the counter account needs to change to reflect reactions 
from the institution under critique. In the politically charged environment of the UK’s health 
                                                          
7 The Labour party is considering nationalisation of SPVs across all sectors using PPPs. Mercer and Whitfield 
(2018) estimate an initial annual cost reduction of £1.4bn that will decline over time, but their work includes 
significant assumptions around acquisition costs and operational cost reductions which could be difficult to 
realise in practice.   
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service, the rhetoric for a policy of austerity could not be pursued in the same way as for 
other services in terms of necessary pain shared to balance the books. Rather reductions in 
purchasing power and per capita spend had to be disguised. In 2018, as we write, the 
political agenda has swung towards the potential for more spending supported by a 
dedicated health tax, because citizens’ perceptions of the quality of services could not be 
ignored, although undoubtedly, conditions about efficiency gains will be attached to 
additional funding. Thus, the hidden austerity measures have impacted the service so that a 
complete restoration is unlikely (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012). We hope that this paper is 
one step in a process of critique of the way in which the austerity agenda has impacted, 
largely under the radar, the financing of a public service that was supposed to have been 
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Table 1 – The initial group of largest projects by capital value 
Name First Date of operation Capital Value £m Included √/ excluded x 
with reason 
1 Barts Health  01-07-2006 1149.0 √ 
2 Birmingham and  
Solihull 
14-05-2008 695.0 X 2 Trusts 
3 Central Manchester 01-07-2005 512.0 √ 
4 North Bristol 27-03-2014 430.0 √ 
5 North Midlands 
(Staffordshire) 
20-08-2012 415.1 √ 
6 Coventry and 
Warwickshire 
01-07-2006 378.9 X 2 Trusts 
7 St Helens and 
Knowsley 
18-11-2008 338.0 √ 
8 Peterborough and 
Stamford 
02-10-2010 336.0 X 3 Trusts 
9 Royal Liverpool 01-04-2017 329.4 X Not yet operational 
10 Sherwood Forest 01-04-2011 326.0 √ 
11 Derby Hospitals 05-05-2006 312.2 √ 
12 Mid Yorkshire 14-04-2008 311.5 √ 
Source: Department of Health spreadsheet
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Table 2 Health expenditure statistics 
 Expenditure per capita in  
current US $ 
Total health expenditure  
as a percentage of GDP 
Public expenditure as a percentage  
of total health expenditure 
 2014 1995 Change as % 
 on 1995 
2014 1995 2014 1995 
UK 3,935 1,364 188%  9.1  6.7 83.1 83.9 
OECD 4,735 2,100 125% 12.4  9.2 62.2 63.3 
EU 3,613 1,651 119% 10.0  8.3 77.8 78.2 
North America 8,990 3,594 150% 16.5 12.8 49.6 46.5 
        
Switzerland 9,674 4,308 125% 11.7  9.3 66.0 53.6 
Sweden 6,808 2,292 197% 11.9  8.0 84.0 86.6 
Netherlands 5,694 2,262 152% 10.9  7.4 87.0 71.0 
Germany 5,411 3,129  73% 11.3  9.4 77.0 81.4 
France 4,959 2,745  81% 11.5 10.1 78.2 79.7 
Spain 2,658 1,129 135%  9.0  7.4 70.9 72.2 










Table 3 - Comprehensive Income and Expenditure Accounts 2015/2016 
£’000s Barts C.M/cr Bristol North 
Midlands 
(Staffs) 






Income   1,342,594  967,394  543,638  702,917  313,287 296,711  130,949  482,792 
Operating 
expenses 
(1,537,545) (961,128) (550,223) (720,992) (323,475) (304,827) (126,082) (515,008) 
Operating 
surplus/(deficit) 
 (194,951)    6,266   (6,585)   (18075)  (10,188) (8,116)    4,867  (32,216) 
Deficit as % of 
income 
14.5% surplus 1.2% 2.6% 3.3% 2.7% surplus 6.7% 
Finance costs* 
(net) 
  (28,655)  (35,476)  (34,820)  (19,673)  (16,310) (18,415)   (3,738)   (8,950) 
Retained 
Surplus/(deficit) 
for the year 
 (223,606)  (29,210)  (41,405) (37,748)  (26,498) (26,531)**    1,129  (41,166) 
Deficit as % of 
income 
16.7% 3.0% 7.6% 5.4% 8.5% 8.9% surplus 8.5% 
Other CI   (47,123)   9,944    5,069 37,570   (5,787)  2,111    6,585   5,446 
         
Total C I& E  (270,729)  (19,266)  (36,336) (178)  (32,285) (24,420)    7,714  (35,720) 
*Including dividends payable on public dividend capital. ** Deficit of 55,046k if exclude impact of impairment reversals 
Source: Financial statements for these Trusts for the year ending 31st March 2016
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Table 4 - Mid Yorkshire NHS Trust - Four year financial results 
£m 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 
Operating income 482.8 483.4 457.1 460.8 
Operating surplus/(deficit) (32.2) 0.2 (5.8) (22.2) 
As % income 6.7% 0 1.3% 4.8% 
Deficit for the year (41.2) (13.2) (19.5) (36.9) 
Deficit as % income 8.5% 2.7% 4.3% 8.0% 
     
Financial Performance Reported to  
Department of Health 
    
Adjusted retained surplus/(deficit) (20.5) (9.1) (19.2) (21.8) 
Adjusted Deficit as % income  4.2% 1.9% 4.2% 4.7% 
 
Table 5 – Surplus (deficit) for the financial year as a percentage of operating income 
£m 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 
Barts Health NHS Trust (16.7) (10.3)   (8.7)   (3.7) 
Central Manchester (3.0)  8.8    0.1    8.9* 
North Bristol (7.6)  (5.0) (29.4)   (3.4) 
North Midlands (Staffs) (5.4) 12.3*   (4.2) (11.3) 
St Helens and Knowsley** (8.5) (13.4)    0.3     3.8 
Sherwood Forest (8.9) (4.9) (8.8)   (6.0) 
Derby Hospitals  0.9 (0.1) (3.4)     0.1 
Mid Yorkshire (8.5) (2.8) (4.3)   (8.0) 
*In 2012/13Central Manchester, and in 2014/15 North Midlands benefited from gains arising on the 
absorption of other healthcare Trusts. Without these gains Central Manchester’s 2012/13 deficit is 3.5% and 
North Midlands 2014/15 deficit is 0.6%.  
**St Helens and Knowsley 2014/2015 deficit was originally reported at a deficit of 0.2%, but expenses were 






Table 6 – Summary of costs of compensation for Mid- Yorkshire 
Costs Estimate £m  
Repayment of debt 392.2 Per Balance Sheet 
Market value of equity  29.0 Using the lowest value based on sub-debt 
return 
Cash balance reduction (25.2) Per Balance Sheet 
Transactions costs   2.0 Hexham estimate £1m this is a much 
bigger project but assuming some 
economies of scale 
Total subject to corporation tax 398.0  
Corporation tax gross up at 19%  90.0 At 19% on the compensation of £398m = 
£75.6m + gross up on tax. 
Total including corporation tax 
gross up 
488.0  
Interest and inflation swap 
breakage and bond redemption 
costs 
 Too uncertain to quantify. 




Table 7 Debt outstanding for Mid Yorkshire 
£m Finance Issued Outstanding 2015/2016 Outstanding 2015/2016 
Bond 171.5 Greater than 12 months 375.9 
Loan 150.0 Less than 12 months  16.3 
Sub-debt  30.9   
Total 352.4 Total cost of compensation 392.2 
Source Mid-Yorkshire SPV financial statements 
Table 8 Summarised Balance Sheet for the Mid Yorkshire Trust. 
£m 31st March 2016 
Non-current assets  419.4 
Current Assets   29.7 
Current liabilities   (56.5) 
Non-current liabilities (327.5) 
Total assets   65.1 
  
Financed by:  
Public dividend capital  196.1 
Retained Earnings (193.3) 
Revaluation reserve   59.6 
Other reserves    2.7 




Table 9 – Summary of costs of compensation for the eight Trusts 












Repayment of debt 1,426.2 459.3 569.0 404.8 357.2 384.9  426.9 392.2 
Market value of equity      74.0   61.0   98.0   16.0   35.0   34.0    48.0   29.0 
Cash balance 
reduction 
   (3.2)  (73.6)   (1.0)  (10.0)   (1.6)  (1.5) (12.2)  (25.2) 
Transactions costs     4.0   2.5   2.5   2.0    1.5     0.5     0.5     2.0 
Total subject to 
corporation tax 
1,501 449.2 668.5 412.8 392.1 417.9 463.2 398.0 
Corporation tax gross 
up at 19% 
   339.4 101.6 151.2   93.3   88.7   94.5 104.7  90.0 
Total including 
corporation tax gross 
up 
1,840.4 550.8 819.7 506.1 480.8 512.4 567.9 488.0 
Interest and inflation 



























Total compensation In excess of 
£1,840m 
In excess of 
£551m 
In excess of 
£820m 
In excess of 
£506m 
In excess of 
£481m 
In excess of 
£512m 
In excess of 
£568m 







Supplementary Information: Expansion of Table 8 to show Summarised Statements of Financial Position for all 8 Trusts as at 31st March 
2016 
Barts, Bristol and Derby show a similar balance sheet position to Mid Yorkshire, and would thus require significant restructuring. St Helens&Knowlsley and 
Sherwood Forest already show deficits. Central Manchester and North Midlands show higher net assets positions, but these are still insufficient to sustain 
the size of increase in long term liabilities that would be required to terminate the contracts. 
£m Barts C.M/cr Bristol North 
Midlands 
(Staffs) 








 1283.8  629.1  528.1   572.3  246.8  277.8  89.3 419.4 
Current Assets    157.6  136.2    87.3     81.7    19.9    18.9  20.4   29.7 
Current 
liabilities 
  (214.3) (113.9) (114.8) (106.9)   (38.1)   (44.4) (15.1)   (56.5) 
Non-current 
liabilities 
(1221.9) (380.1) (486.1) (325.2) (260.4) (394.9) (30.5) (327.5) 
Total assets         5.2  271.3    14.5   221.9   (31.9) (142.6)  64.1   65.1 
         
Financed by:         
Public dividend 
capital 
 306.5 196.0  241.4  362.5    64.5  144.5 16.1  196.1 
Retained 
Earnings 
(475.0)   29.6 (314.2) (284.3) (101.0) (302.0)  (1.2) (193.3) 
Revaluation 
reserve 
 173.7   45.7    87.3  143.7      4.6    14.9 40.5   59.6 
Other reserves         8.7    2.7 
Total      5.2 271.3    14.5  221.9  (31.9) (142.6) 64.1   65.1 
 
